I show that the prices of the internationally traded crypto-currency bitcoin can be used to estimate a currency's unofficial exchange rate and capital controls at a daily interval. Two important bitcoin features are documented: (1) Bitcoin-based exchange rates approximate the behavior, but not the level, of unofficial exchange rates, and (2) Bitcoin prices contain a bitcoin-trend term and must be appropriately normalized prior to being used for this purpose. Bitcoin-based exchange rates reveal that (3) there is no consistent pattern of Granger causality between unofficial rates and official rates by exchange rate regime or barriers at the daily frequency, and (4) that countries can engage in short-interval capital controls.
INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to obtain accurate data for unofficial exchange rates. 1 Most papers examining unofficial exchange rate behavior rely on the same data source: the World Currency Yearbook. 2 Rates in the World Currency Yearbook "are provided by the Central Bank and Ministries of Finance who may be reluctant to provide the true data", or reported by "foreign correspondents or informed currency dealers". [Bahmani-Oskoee, Miteza, and Nasir [2002] ]. This data consists of a single observation per month. Similar issues exist in attempting to quantify barriers to international financial flows, as countries may impose unofficial barriers or put in place official barriers that have no effect. Efforts to directly measure barriers, without relying on government reports, requires data that is usually released only annually, limiting the frequency at which the barriers estimates can be updated. 3 Its virtual, online nature allows bitcoin to function both as a method to bypass restrictions on the acquisition of foreign currency and as an alternative to the official, potentially manipulated, exchange rate. I examine whether daily price data from bitcoin sales in various currencies can be used to both construct a meaningful alternative dataset of daily unofficial exchange rates, and be used to detect barriers to global financial integration. 4 Because bitcoin prices can be directly observed, this method requires no reporting agents, thereby removing potential reporting bias.
Moreover, because bitcoin has an alternative use as an investment vehicle, bitcoin trades exist even if a currency is freely floating and therefore a bitcoin exchange rate for exists for currencies that are both floating and managed. 5 1 I use to the term "unofficial" to broadly include what others call the market, black market, parallel, or de-facto exchange rates. 2 The World Currency Yearbook was formerly known as Pick's Currency Yearbook. Some papers cite Reinhart and Rogoff [2004] as their data source-this dataset was also built using the World Currency Yearbook. Papers that do not use the World Currency Yearbook are usually restricted to examining only one currency: for example, while Huett, Krapf, and Uysal [2014] use online data, the trades are only for the Belarusian ruble to the US dollar, euro, and Russian ruble.
3 Literature that estimates international financial barriers is reviewed in Section 4.3. 4 Minute-by-minute data is also available. However, to maintain a large sample size and reduce missing observations, daily data is used. 5 For example, Huett, Krapf, and Uysal [2014] found that trading of the Belarusin ruble ceased once the currency was allowed to float.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I provide a brief introduction to bitcoin, its history, and relevant terminology and literature. In Section 3 I discuss data collection and bitcoin exchange rate construction, and why the ratio of bitcoin prices does not trivially yield a usable exchange rate.
In Section 4, I use a cointegration test (either the Johansen trace test or the Pesaran-Shin-Smith bounds testing procedure) and the results of a vector error correction model or conditional error correction model to identify barriers to the acquisition of foreign currency. I identify exchange rate manipulation by the magnitude of the bitcoin and official exchange rate ratio in Section 5. After showing that bitcoin reflects the trend (but not the level) of unofficial exchange rates in section 6.1, I update results in the literature regarding the relationship between official and unofficial exchange rates-previously focused on managed exchange rate regimes and using monthly observationsfor the remainder of Section 6. Specifically, I show that (1) the proportionality restriction (required for many models of unofficial market exchange rates) exists for all exchange rate regimes as long as there are no restrictions to access of foreign currency; and (2) Granger causality between the official and bitcoin exchange rate follows no consistent pattern across regimes or barriers when using daily exchange rate data.
WHAT IS BITCOIN? A BRIEF HISTORY
The purpose of this section is to give the interested reader only as much information as needed to understand bitcoin for this paper. For a comprehensive overview of bitcoin, readers should consult Velde [2013] . Böhme, Christin, Edelman, and Moore [2015] wrote an accesible technical review of bitcoin, and Brandvold, Molnar, Vagstad, and Valstad [2015] contains a brief discussion of major events in bitcoin history. White [2015] considers the market for crypto-currencies more broadly.
Bitcoin is a crypto-currency designed and created by the entity Nakamoto [2008] . 6 A cryptocurrency is entirely digital, with no central monetary authority, country of origin, or physical representation. Nakamoto created 21 million bitcoin, which are discovered by solving mathematical algorithms in a process known as "mining". Once discovered, a bitcoin can be held, used for retail 6 The name Satoshi Nakamoto is a pseudonym. The identity of Satoshi (person or persons) is currently unknown. purchases, or bought and sold on a bitcoin trading website in exchange for a variety of currencies. 7 Dwyer [2015] explores why the ability to use bitcoin for these purposes could result in a cryptocurrency with a positive price, while Luther [2016] examines conditions under which a positive price may not result even if bitcoin is superior to existing monies.
A website where bitcoin can be bought and sold is known as an "exchange." Every account on an exchange has a virtual "wallet" in which the users can store both their bitcoin 8 and the currencies accepted by the exchange. Currency in a wallet can be directly deposited into or withdrawn from a connected bank account, an online payment system (such as PayPal), or into a wallet associated with a different exchange. An example of an exchange buy/sell interface is shown in Figure   1 , using the exchange ANXBTC. An exchange user can buy bitcoin using currency in their wallet (in Figure 1 , US dollars would be used to purchase bitcoin) and in a matter of seconds, sell the purchased bitcoin for a different currency (selecting EUR from the drop-down menu would sell the bitcoin for euros), which would be deposited back into their wallet. This illustrates why the bitcoin price in US dollars and in euros can be used to construct an exchange rate: bitcoin can function like a vehicle currency for foreign exchange swaps, a role traditionally held by the US dollar. 9 Unlike traditional vehicle currencies, access to bitcoin (and its associated exchange rate to other foreign currencies) is very difficult to restrict as it requires preventing individuals from accessing any one of exchange websites. 10 Additionally, bitcoin prices in different currencies among various independent, globally established exchanges are publicly and instantaneously available to all agents without charge regardless of the agent's country of origin.
The online nature and pseudo-anonymity of bitcoin has resulted in its use in online criminal transactions. 11 The "Silk Road" market is the most widely known example. Silk Road was not 7 I use the term "currency" to refer exclusively to a currency issued by a central monetary authority (e.g., the US dollar) as opposed to crypto-currencies, such as bitcoin or litecoin.
8 Technically, the wallet does not actually "store a bitcoin," though from a user's perspective, this is functionally what occurs. For details, refer to Böhme, Christin, Edelman, and Moore [2015] .
9 Systems for direct currency trades have recently been implemented by some exchanges. As these systems are still in their infancy (having poor data availability), transactions of this nature will not be considered. 10 Hendrickson, Hogan, and Luther [2016] consider governmental efforts to discourage bitcoin use. 11 Contrary to popular belief, bitcoin is not anonymous. The entire transaction history of a bitcoin travels with it in the bitcoin's publicly visible "blockchain"-equivalent to a digital ledger. Pieters and Vivanco [2015] have examined the implication of this on bitcoin pricing, finding that it contributes to the bitcoin market segmentation that is also FIGURE 1 Buy/Sell Interface on the ANXBTC Bitcoin Exchange a bitcoin exchange; rather, it was an online marketplace for the sale of drugs and other illegal activities where transactions were conducted in bitcoin to reduce the ability of law enforcement to trace payments. Bitcoin has a variety of legal uses as well-an investment asset, or as a means to purchase goods from major companies (Dell and Amazon both allow the purchase of items using bitcoin, either directly or through the purchase of a gift card). Because bitcoin has these other uses, even currencies with unrestricted capital markets and unmanipulated exchange rates have bitcoin trading activity, and therefore, a bitcoin price. These uses allow for the construction of a bitcoin exchange rate for currencies with a variety of exchange rate regimes, from the euro and Canadian dollar to the Chinese yuan and Argentinian peso.
A major structural change to the bitcoin market occurred after the sudden failure and bankruptcy of Mt. Gox, an exchange that handled up to 80% of the world's bitcoin trade, in February 2014. 12 Given the enormity of the changes that followed the Mt. Gox collapse, this paper only focuses detected in this paper.
12 CoinDesk (www.coindesk.com/companies/exchanges/mtgox) provides more details surrounding this event.
on the period after June 1, 2014, when the bitcoin market stabilized after nearly six months of instability and structural changes, even though the first bitcoin was traded in January assume the impact that these regulations have on the global bitcoin market is minimal.
The average daily volume of trade measures the bitcoin trades conducted in the indicated currency, either in units of bitcoin (BTC) or in the currency indicated. The volume of trades measured in bitcoin is slightly misleading because a bitcoin is highly divisible: the smallest bitcoin unit is the bitcoin-satoshi, which equals 10 −9 bitcoin (a hundred-millionth of a bitcoin). US dollar trades are the most popular trades (as measured by BTC) for all exchanges in this sample. While trade volumes on bitcoin markets represent only a small fraction of the official currency markets, even the smallest exchange has a daily volume of over a quarter-million US dollars in USD-bitcoin trades.
Official exchange rate data come from Oanda.com. Oanda reports the average exchange rate over a 24-hour period of global trading, seven days a week-a structure similar to the exchange rate created by bitcoin data. I linearly interpolate each series to estimate missing values, resulting in 487 daily observations per bitcoin exchange and currency.
DEFINING BITCOIN EXCHANGE RATES
Using bitcoin prices in the currency of interest (B C m,t ) and the US dollar (B USD m,t ) the implied bitcoin exchange rate, (E B,C m,t ), is given by:
for exchange (m) on day (t) between currency (C) and the US dollar. This equation uses bitcoin as a vehicle currency, buying bitcoin in one currency to sell it for another. Figure 2 shows the bitcoin US dollar to Euro exchange rate constructed for the four selected exchanges, as well as the official exchange rate. The bitcoin exchange rate constructed from ANXBTC and itBit data almost indistinguishable from the official exchange rate, unlike the exchange rate calculated using BTC-E and LocalBitcoins data. As the USD-Euro exchange rate represents the most easily accessible official and bitcoin exchange rates across the various currencies, this figure shows why the question of how to appropriately compare bitcoin exchange rate to official exchange rate data is even asked, as the data from various exchanges do not appear to be FIGURE 2 USD to Euro Exchange Rate for Four Exchanges interchangeable. This is consistent with the findings of Pieters and Vivanco [2015] , who show that arbitrage is not satisfied across the various bitcoin exchanges due to differences in the structure of the exchanges. I assume the relationship between bitcoin and official exchange rates across the various exchange markets consists of two terms: a stationary, potentially non-zero, mark-up term, (ε C,m ), and a trend difference term, (ρ C,m ), and can be expressed in the form 15 :
The absolute Law of One Price (aLOP) requires that the bitcoin and official exchange rates are identical, ρ c,m = 0 and ε C,m = 0, while relative Law of One Price (rLOP) allows for a level differences and requires only that the two exchange rates follow the same trend, ρ c,m = 0 and ε C,m = 0.
A failure of the absolute law of one price is expected because both the bitcoin exchanges and official currency vendors charge fees for currency trades, thereby introducing an arbitrage band, ε C,m = 0, into the markets. This band can be identified in Figure 2 as the non-zero difference be-15 I refer to ρ C,m as a trend difference term as it captures the differences in the trend of the two series:
tween the official and bitcoin exchange rates. The trend difference, ρ c,m , is most easily be seen as the increasing distance between LocalBitcoin and the official exchange rate series (recall that ε C,m is stationary). Akram, Rime, and Sarno [2008] studied global financial and exchange rate contracts of different durations, and found that most price deviations in exchange rate markets were quickly arbitraged away, implying that exchange rates across foreign exchange markets should adhere to rLOP.
Relative to official exchange rate markets, the bitcoin's global simultaneity (exchanges never close) and ease of comparison of prices across bitcoin markets (bitcoin prices in all currencies are globally and simultaneously available to the public at no charge, and there are no exchange rate contracts of different lengths) imply that arbitrage opportunities caused by the difference between the official and unofficial exchange rates should be found and exploited by any participant even more quickly and easily than on the official markets studied in Akram, Rime, and Sarno [2008] . However, Yermack [2015] argues that bitcoin should not be thought of as a currency and should, therefore, be treated as a traded good. In examining the behavior of car prices across the eurozone after the introduction of the euro, Goldberg and Verboven [2005] found convergence to both the absolute and relative law of one price, while in a study examining consumer goods prices across European cities, Engel and Rogers [2004] found no evidence of convergence. It is therefore possible that some aspect of bitcoin or a bitcoin exchange-one that cannot be easily removed-could overwhelm convergence to the exchange rate causing rLOP between the official and bitcoin exchange rate to fail. I assume that the trend difference term, ρ c,m , can be decomposed into three components:
The deviation from the official exchange rate trend that occurs because of bitcoin-and is therefore shared across all bitcoin exchanges and currencies-is reflected in (ρ B ). The bitcoin-exchangespecific wedge-capturing differences in fees or structures specific to a bitcoin exchange-is re-flected in (ρ m ). Finally, (ρ C ) denotes any deviations between the official and bitcoin exchange rates that are currency-specific. 16 All components can take positive or negative values. Given an estimate of ρ C,m for two different currencies, C1 and C2, on the same exchange m, the form assumed in Equation (3) allows a normalized currency-specific wedge to isolated, removing the impact of both bitcoin and the exchange:
Studying the prices of stocks that trade on both domestic and international markets, Yeyati, Schmukler, and Horen [2009] showed that price segmentation resulted from cross-border capital regulations functioning as a barrier in international financial markets. Similarly, Goldberg and Verboven [2005] interpreted the reduction in car price segmentation across the eurozone as a reduction in the barriers in the international goods market. Therefore, irrespective of whether bitcoin should be thought of as a good or as money, ρ C1,C2 = 0 can be interpreted as implying the existence of a barrier in accessing official exchange rates from the bitcoin exchange rate market, while a finding of ρ C1,C2 = 0 is consistent with rLOP in exchange rates. After describing the method used to estimate ρ C1,C2 in Section 3.3, I shall verify in Section 4.3 that estimates of ρ C1,C2 reflect known barriers in the currency market, verifying that the bitcoin components are removed from ρ C1,C2 in this normalization, as part of the contribution of this paper.
TESTING FOR COINTEGRATION
As both the official and bitcoin exchange rate series for each currency are found to be nonstationary, determining whether ρ C1,C2 = 0 requires care. First I test the official and bitcoin exchange rates for cointegration. A failure to find cointegration is inconsistent with flexible, market-based exchange rates because it implies that the official and bitcoin exchange rates do not share a trend. This failure is consistent with a barrier in access to international exchange markets (for example, capital If both the official and bitcoin exchange rate series for a given currency accept ADF and reject KPSS, the requirements of the Johansen trace test are satisfied. Series that accept both ADF and KPSS could be either fractionally integrated or integrated to an order higher than I[1]. To differentiate, I re-run the ADF and KPSS tests on the first difference of the series. I consistently find that the first difference rejects ADF and accepts KPSS; therefore, the original series is fractionally integrated and the methods of the PSS bounds test are applied to that currency instead.
17 Cointegration tests are biased against finding cointegration if one of the series contains a structural break. Within this setting, however, the exchange rate series should share the timing and magnitude of a structural break if there are no barriers, so a finding of no cointegration in this setting is consistent with the interpretation of a barrier. Therefore, I do not include controls for structural breaks.
3.3.2 Johansen Trace Test. The Johansen test iteratively tests a null hypothesis that no more than r equations exist, which describe the trend relationship between n series (with r = 0 indicating no cointegration), accepting the first value of r for which the null is not rejected. As I consider only two series, there can be at most one cointegrating equation, so the test should obtain significant results for r = 1 if the two sources of exchange rates are to be cointegrated.
The trace test is based on a vector error correction model (VECM). Given the vector of the bitcoin and official exchange rate for a given market and currency,
(where market and currency notations are suppressed in future equations for clarity), the VECM estimates the following:
where ∆E t = E t − E t−1 , is the lag, and ε t are standard mean zero, independent, identically distributed shocks. I select the initial lag according to the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC).
After running the VECM at lag , a Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is used to test for autocorrelation in the residuals. If the LM test null of no autocorrelation is rejected at the 5% level, the value of the lag is incremented by one. The order of integration and the tests for residual autocorrelation are repeated. If the null is not rejected, the Johansen trace test is applied.
The cointegrating relationship between the two series is captured in Π, where
Among cointegrated series,β is the variable of interest because a failure to findβ = 1 implies that the bitcoin exchange rate growth (the long-run trend) is either larger (β > 1) or smaller (β < 1) than the official exchange rate.
PSS Bounds Test
The PSS bounds test is based on the unrestricted conditional errorcorrection model (CECM), expressed in notation from Section 3.3.2 as:
where y refers to either the bitcoin or official exchange rate, and x refers to the exchange rate not used in y, and is the lag (initially selected by SBIC or passed by the process in Section 3.3.2).
A significant restriction of the PSS method is that the CECM requires a single direction of causality, which I establish before proceeding. In Equation (6), I assume that E x t causes E y t , or in the parlance of PSS, E x t is the forcing function for E y t . Given the presence of series that are not I(0), I use the methodology of Toda and Yamamoto [1995] (TY) to determine Granger causality, first estimating a vector autoregression model (VAR) on the data with lags + 1:
where E t−( +1) is an exogenous variable. If I find residual autocorrelation at either or +1, the lag is incremented and the procedure repeated, with each series order of integration once again verified.
If I find that both series are unit root processes, the Johansen trace test (described in Section 3.3.2) is applied. Otherwise, causality is tested using the TY methodology described above. Table 2 , is more interesting as it is not true across all exchanges thatβ EUR,M = 1, even though the Euro exchange rate is a major, easily accessible market. The relationship between the estimated long-run cointegrating relationship,β EUR,M and the trend difference introduced in Section 3.2 can be expressed as:β
Theβ EUR,ANX = 1 result of ANXBTC implies that the rLOP holds; the trend difference component is calculated to be ρ B + ρ ANXBTC + ρ EUR = 0. As expected given Figure 2 , this is not strictly true for the remaining three exchanges, with LocalBitcoins exhibiting a substantial deviation. Table 2 therefore verifies a significant result implied by the visual examination of Figure 2 : while it may be tempting to assume that the rLOP should hold between bitcoin and official exchange rates trends, or thatβ C,M = 1 and ρ B + ρ m + ρ C = 0, this may not be a valid assumption due to non-negligible trends within either bitcoin or the bitcoin exchange. Therefore, I useβ EUR,M to normalize the remaining estimates and remove bitcoin-specific (ρ B ) and exchange-specific (ρ M ) effects for any currency, using equation 4 to generate ρ C1,C2 as defined in Section 3.2. This estimates the currency trend wedge relative to the euro trend wedge (ρ C ), normalized to range from zero to one:ρ
This value is reported in the final column of Table 2 . The highest value ofρ C = 1 indicates high barriers to access official exchange rate markets, while the lowest value ofρ C = 0 indicates a barrier equivalent to that of the USD-EUR exchange rate (low barriers), while the effective size of a country's barrier can then be ranked based on its distance fromρ C = 0.
DETECTING BARRIERS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
Assessing the extent of effective barriers to international currency flows is a difficult task, as re- Table 3 presents results from the cointegration tests, the unadjusted trend coefficientsβ , and estimated barrierρ C . 19 I divide all results into three broad categories, and within each category currencies are sorted by their lowest value ofρ C . A "High Barriers" currency failed to find cointegration, while both the "Low Barriers" and "Intermediate Barriers" currency obtained cointegra- that using the unadjusted coefficient,β , that does not remove bitcoin-specific trends would yield a different ordering of barriers, illustrating the importance of adjusting for bitcoin-specific trends in 18 Results are not compared to this index because it terminates in 2004. 19 The bitcoin exchange rate data from ANXBTC for HKD, and LocalBitcoins for AUD, CHF, GBP, HKD, INR, NZD, RUB, and SGD, are problematic (either exhibiting residual autocorrelation, or failing to yield a single direction of causality); thus, they were removed. the exchange rate market. With seven exceptions, the barriers of each of the currencies are in the same order as presented in KAOPEN. Four are found to have lower barriers relative to other countries than those reported by KAOPEN, and three have higher barriers than reported by KAOPEN. I examine the reasons for these seven deviations in Sections 4.3.1-4.3.3, and find them to reflect either the granularity of the data, or the newer nature of the bitcoin data. I therefore conclude that an alternative measure of barriers can be constructed using bitcoin data. Prior to January 15, 2015, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) had a minimum exchange rate peg in place relative to the euro. Comparing the official and bitcoin exchange rates in Figure 4 [b], it appears this peg had been binding as the two exchange rates do not share a similar trend. On January 15, the SNB formally abandoned its peg (to the apparent surprise of all market participants given the reaction in both markets) and lowered its target interest rate further into negative territory. 20 After the removal of the peg, bitcoin and official exchange rates appear to share a trend.
DOES BITCOIN REVEAL BARRIERS TO OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE MARKETS?
While the peg had been in place since September 2011 and is therefore in the data used to construct KAOPEN, it may not have been a binding minimum constraint during that time. For the Norwegian krone (NOK), a structural break in the bitcoin exchange was detected on December 8, 2014. Unlike the Swiss franc, no obvious event coincides with this date. However, given that
Norway is physically proximate to eurozone countries that underwent great economic upheaval during this time period, it is possible that the NOK exchange rate anomaly reflects spillover from those economies.
High Barrier Currencies
Of the four countries that have high barriers, Mexico ( Figure   5 [a]) is found to have more capital restrictions than expected given KAOPEN. While Mexico is commonly classified as a freely floating exchange rate, it strongly rejects cointegration with the bitcoin exchange rate. Though several factors could explain a change in the exchange rate (the fall of oil prices; implementation of austerity cuts; a political scandal), none of these events can explain a divergence between the official and bitcoin exchange rates visible at the beginning of October 2014. The last paragraph on page 53 of the Banco de Mexico January-March 2015 Quarterly
Report [Banco De Mexico, 2015] , detailed in more depth by Cardenas [2015] , briefly mentions a possible cause. Informally, Mexico has an acceptable band for its exchange rate. The exchange rate moved out of this band, causing the central bank to intervene and manipulate its exchange rate through an auction. This intervention-which represented a change in the exchange rate regimeresulted in the divergence of the official and unofficial exchanges rates, beginning in October 2014.
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC EVENTS AND BITCOIN EXCHANGE RATES
In Figure 5 [b], the South African rand (ZAR) shows two clear episodes where bitcoin exchange rates changed without any corresponding movement in the official exchange rate: on April 17, 20 January 2015 SNB press release (www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre 20150115/source/pre 20150115.en.pdf). events that received only limited international attention-on April 17 there was mass anti-migrant riots and violence, and on May 21 there were nationwide police raids, which resulted in approximately 4000 arrests in connection to the riots the month before-suggestive evidence that the bitcoin exchange rates are not formed purely by international speculators.
Turning to the Chinese yuan (CNY), Figure 5 (c) shows that the official and bitcoin exchange rates were slowly separating from each other. The eventual 1.9% exchange rate devaluation on August 10, 2015, represents a noticeable trend break in both series, and has resulted in a bitcoin and official Chinese exchange rate that is subsequently very similar in both trend and level (or more succinctly, an official CNY rate that reflects the bitcoin market rate) implying that the devaluation has succesfully realinged the Chinese and American currencies.
BITCOIN AND UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES

DETECTING EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
While the most common officially reported exchange rate regime is a free-or managed-float regime, Calvo and Reinhart [2002] found that the exchange rates of many countries resembled that of a fixed or highly managed exchange rate (a phenomenon they termed "fear of floating").
Crucially, Alesina and Wagner [2006] showed countries with relatively good institutions use a declaration of a floating regime to signal their virtuousness, rather than countries with poor political institutions (the typical suspects for bad or misreported data).
This inconsistency between the declared and actual exchange rate regimes has led to many attempts to find other systems of classifying exchange rate regimes based not on self-reporting but on observed behavior. Reinhart and Rogoff [2004] retroactively reclassified exchange rate regimes using the observed behavior of the official and parallel exchange rate data between 1946 and 1998; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [2005] constructed a classification based on official exchange rates and international reserves; Shambaugh [2004] used the volatility of the official exchange rate;
while Quéré, Coeuré, and Mignon [2006] used a stability criteria against a market basket of currencies. Consequent to the findings of Calvo and Reinhart [2002] , the IMF regime classification now takes into consideration the behavior of the exchange rate in addition to the country's official statement. Kiguel and O'Connell [1995] argued that a significant difference between the market and official rates may signal fundamental macroeconomic misalignments; therefore, the difference should be greater for managed exchange rates than it is for market exchange rates. I define the premium between the official and bitcoin exchange rate, M C m,t , as:
Because there is a bitcoin-exchange-specific premium (given that the exchanges charge different fees and have different structures), and Figure 2 showed that this premium was non-zero for some exchanges even for the Euro, I adjust the premium by the value of the euro premium for the
I consider the mean of this adjusted premium to classify exchange rates. Note that is possible for an exchange rate to have no barrier (ρ = 0), while still maintaining a positive premium ε C . This is consistent with exchange rate pegs maintained by domestic policy, instead of international financial markets controls (which would have be detected using the methodology in Section 4.3).
5.2 EXCHANGE RATE REGIME Table 4 lists the mean and standard deviation of the adjusted markup for each currency and bitcoin exchange. Three clear clusters emerge: markups between 0 and 0.5%, which I categorize as "Market" regimes; currencies with markups between 0.5 and 2%, which I categorize as "Mildly There are eight differences in classifications, with seven currencies found to be more managed that their IMF classification suggests and one currency found to be less managed. The differences are discussed in detail in Sections 5.2.1-5.2.3, and are similar to the reasons discussed in Section 4.3. Overall, once appropriately adjusted, bitcoin can be used to determined exchange rate regime.
5.2.1 Market Exchange Rate Regimes Bitcoin and the IMF disagree regarding the Singapore dollar (SGD, Figure 3 [e]), with the IMF considering it a stabilized arrangement and bitcoin classifying it as a floating exchange rate. I found low premiums on both bitcoin exchanges that sell Singapore dollars. This result implies that while Singapore is officially managing its currency, the resulting exchange rate is not substantially different from the market exchange rate. were found to be low barrier currencies: the IMF classifies them as floating, but they appear to be highly managed exchange rate regimes based on the bitcoin premium. As detailed in Human Rights Watch [2015] , Thailand underwent a political coup by the military in May 2014, so the premium may reflect underlying uncertainty regarding the economic stability of the country. A similar explanation may also apply to Brazil, which faced a series of large protests in 2015 due to alleged political corruption within the state owned energy company Petrobas, the beginning of which is discussed in Prada [2015] .
Mildly Managed Exchange
A COMPARISON OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES
DO BITCOIN EXCHANGE RATES REFLECT UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES?
It seems reasonable, given that the bitcoin exchange rate is determined by the market, that it provides an estimate of a currency's unofficial exchange rate, especially after controlling for bitcoinspecific trends. Historically, unofficial exchange rate data have been both expensive and difficult to obtain, and, because they are reported rather than directly observed the data are subject to quality concerns. The ability to use the bitcoin exchange rate as a free alternative source for unofficial exchange rate movement data could alleviate many of these concerns. The results in Section 4.1 (showing that there could be significant bitcoin and bitcoin exchange trends) should, however, invite pause because it implies that bitcoin-specific trends may distort the bitcoin exchange rate.
To test whether bitcoin can be interpreted as the unofficial exchange rate, I examine the behavior of bitcoin relative to that of the unofficial Argentinian exchange rate. Argentina is widely known to have a long-established crawling peg regime with the US dollar and a highly manipulated exchange rate, and its unofficial exchange rate is reported daily by various sources (including Argentinian newspapers), reducing many of the concerns typically associated with estimates of the unofficial exchange rate.
FIGURE 6
Comparison of Argentinian Exchange Rates I obtain unofficial exchange rate data fromÁmbito Financiero, a daily newspaper based in Buenos Aires. The official, unofficial, and adjusted bitcoin exchange rate of the Argentian Peso to the US dollar are shown in Figure 6 . 21 A visual examination reveals that the bitcoin exchange rate (dashed line) closely follows the time trend of the unofficial exchange rate (dotted line) but not the 21 The bitcoin rate has been smoothed by a five-point smoothing filter to aid visual analysis. official exchange rate (solid line). Table 5 lists the corresponding cointegration test, VECM, and premium for the three exchange rates. There is no cointegrating relationship between the official exchange rate and either the unofficial or bitcoin exchange rate, as expected given the strict capital controls. A cointegrating relationship does exist for the unofficial and bitcoin exchange rates. Additionally, the VECM reveals that these two exchange rates obey the rLOP, reflecting the same information. These findings, together with the earlier discussion of the South African rand (ZAR) exchange rate that showed national domestic domestic events affecting the exchange rates suggests that bitcoin is not only being used by speculative foreign investors but also by residents of these countries. Interestingly, the data in Table 5 reveal that even though unofficial and bitcoin exchange rates are cointegrated, there is a significant negative premium, even after adjusting the mean for the bitcoin-specific markup (−6.04%). This persistence, even after adjusting for an exchange-specific premium, must reflect an element that is not found in the bitcoin-based euro exchange rate and therefore cannot be normalized. It could reflect, for example, the convenience and relative safety of using bitcoin exchange rate channels that are not as relevant or significant for euro currency transactions or similar floating-exchange-rate regimes. This indicates that bitcoin should not be used to estimate the level-value of the unofficial exchange rate. However, given the cointegration results bitcoin exchange rates can be used to determine trends of the unofficial exchange rate.
PROPORTIONALITY
The modeling approach of Dornbusch, Dantas, Pechman, Rocha, and Simoes [1983] -using a portfolio choice model as the starting point for a model of dual exchange rate markets where each exchange rate is the price of an asset (in this case, the currency)-is frequently used as a launching point to examine the relationship between official and unofficial exchange rates. This approach implies a long-run constant proportionality between the official and unofficial exchange rates (or a rLOP between identical assets). Papers using multiyear datasets have found only mixed evidence for a proportionality relationship: Caporale and Cerrate [2008] rejected a proportionality relationship, while Bahmani-Oskoee, Miteza, and Nasir [2002] and Kula, Aslan, and Ozturk [2014] found evidence in support of it. Table 6 shows that all exchange rate regimes can satisfy the proportionality requirement. Given that my barrier index broadly reflects the ordering of KAOPEN, it implies that proportionality is more likely to be satisfied if countries do not implement barriers and therefore, the mixed findings in the literature could reflect the existence of unofficial barriers. 
CAUSALITY
The unofficial exchange rate is thought to Granger-cause the official exchange rate in a managed exchange rate regime, as the unofficial exchange rate reflects current market information that may take time to be reflected in the official rate. Baliamoune-Lutz and Lutz [2008] and BaliamouneLutz [2010] documented that the black market exchange rate Granger-causes the official rates Tunisia and Morocco (managed exchange rate regimes), providing support for this hypothesis.
However, Huett, Krapf, and Uysal [2014] , found mutual causation between the official and unofficial exchange rates for the managed Belarusian ruble. Using the TY method described in Section 3.3.3, I test for Granger causality across all currencies. Unlike the aforementioned studies, I can compare both floating and managed exchange rates, and currencies with and without binding barriers to foreign exchange markets, over the same period and on a daily basis. Table 7 presents the causality test results. There is no uniform pattern across barriers and exchange rate regimes. Half of the market regimes have causality from bitcoin to official exchange rates, half of the mildly managed regimes have bidirectional causality, and half of the highly managed regimes show causality from the official rate to bitcoin. A single direction of causality occurs for 10 out of 13 currencies with low barriers, and for 1 out of 4 currencies with the highest level of high barriers. This result is not surprising if a change in the official exchange rate to an event that causes a change in the unofficial exchange rate occurs only infrequently, and takes multiple days or weeks to occur. This would weaken any causality relationship estimated on higher frequency daily data, instead of monthly data. Indeed, Huett et al. [2014] , who also did not find causality from unofficial to official exchange rates, were also using daily data, lending support to this interpretation.
CONCLUSIONS
This work proposes a method to use bitcoin-transaction prices in various currencies to construct a currency's unofficial exchange rate, detect the size of barriers to the official exchange rate, and identify exchange rate regimes. Bitcoin-based exchange rates can be used to identify episodes of capital movement that, due to their transitory nature, current classification systems (such as the IMF or the Chinn-Ito index) cannot detect. This method of identification has powerful implications for future applied and policy work, as bitcoin data are publicly available at no charge on a daily basis-even as events unfold-and cannot be manipulated by bad reporting as could be the case with the World Currency Yearbook or, to a lesser extent, the IMF classification system. Additionally, even if governments temporarily cease to gather data due to political or economic upset, the bitcoin data continue to exist and accrue.
Findings from earlier work that show mixed evidence regarding Granger causality between official and unofficial exchange rates is re-examined over the same time period for a variety of regimes and barriers, and explained as causality is not found to consistently flow from the unofficial bitcoin rate to the official rate when using daily data. Even among highly managed regimes, Granger causality exists in all variationsd. Proportionality between unofficial and official exchange rates is possible for all regimes, but more likely to exist in the absence of barriers.
